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AN EXPOSURE

OF THE

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ATTEMPTS

TO DESTROY THE

BRITISH CONSTITUTION,

UPON THE NEW DOCTRINES RECOMMENDED,

BY A

MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT,

AND OF HIS MAJESTY'S PRIVY COUNCIL.

NOLUMUS LEGES ANGLIÆ MUTARE.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR JOHN STOCKDALE, PICCADILLY.

1793.

[PRICE TWO SHILLINGS.]

BRITISH MUSEUM

TO THE PUBLIC.

THE following ſheets were written for your ſervice; if, on the preſent momentous criſis they can, in the ſmalleſt degree, contribute to it, your favourable acceptance of them will be the higheſt gratification an honeſt citizen can receive. Perhaps it may encourage the author to go through the plan he has propoſed to himſelf, of unfolding to you the other * means uſed, both by foreign and domeſtic enemies,

* It will, perhaps, be difficult to do ſo without going pretty much at large into the French conſtitution, and the means which have been uſed to form, I will not ſay to eſtabliſh it, for nothing under the ſun, in my opinion, ever was leſs *eſtabliſhed*. A great and extenſive ſubject indeed! in which much blame is juſtly to be laid on all ſides; much vice and much weakneſs to be imputed to the old ſyſtem; for which, in truth, nothing *but its ſucceſſor* could be an apology: much falſe conception, as well as much depravity of various ſorts, to be imputed to the new! I have only now, therefore, to deſire my readers not to conſider any general expreſſions which may incidentally occur, as inſinuating more than is expreſſed, or applied farther than I apply them; and to give me credit for wiſhing to ſuſpend my judgment upon every other particular, till I can make that judgment better worth their conſideration,

either to rob you by violence, or tempt you to betray the excellent conſtitution committed to your care. I truſt, however, that while you have either hearts to feel, or minds to underſtand the bleſſings you enjoy, neither force nor fraud can deprive you of them. The times, and the country in which we live, muſt be the monument of our *glory* or our *ſhame*. It depends on you *which* you will perpetuate. Let us remember that infamy may be entailed as well as honour: the coronet, which marks the brilliant victories or civil merits of an anceſtor, may alſo ſerve to emblazon the degeneracy of his deſcendant. When we tranſmit to our children the land which has deſcended to us from our fathers, we leave them a poor inheritance indeed, which they can neither occupy or maintain, unleſs we leave them the title deeds to the eſtate. When we ſwear allegiance (*as allegiance, I truſt, we ſhall ſwear*) to the neareſt deſcendant of our excellent ſovereign; (though long may that day be deferred, *ſerus in cælum redeat*;) let us remember that we ſhall, indeed, place a "*barren ſceptre in his gripe*," unleſs we ſwear under the banners of *that conſtitution* which at once ſecures the *greatneſs* of a *good* king, and the *happineſs* of a *free people*.

AMONG the various publications which either the intereſt or ingenuity of individuals, the fair motive of diſcuſſing public ſubjects, or the acrimony of party have ever produced, few have perhaps been known to excite ſo general an indignation in the minds of all thinking perſons as a letter, calling itſelf by a ſtrange perverſion of language, "A Treatiſe on the *Rights* of Man, in Anſwer to a Pamphlet of Mr. Burke's." This is not to be aſcribed to any enthuſiaſtic reſentment againſt the calumniator of a perſon, who, as long as ſuperior abilities and knowledge are reſpected, and until the ſyſtem of Equality

ſhall be ſo perfected as to reform the oppreſſion which thoſe qualities, ſo unequally diſtributed, have hitherto exerciſed over mankind, will be conſidered as one of the ornaments of the Britiſh name: it is not, I ſay, to any general popularity of this individual, much as by many he is admired; it is not to any natural reluctance in the Engliſh to hear truths, however painful or ſevere; it is not to any partiality for French monarchy, or to any reſpect or gratitude to the ſyſtem purſued by that nation in reſpect to others under that monarchy, that this feeling is to be aſcribed; but it is, that mankind cannot ſee, without abhorrence, a cold deliberate attempt to ſap the contentment and the peace of the happieſt nation upon earth; to render inſecure every ſpecies of property and rank which the higher and middle orders enjoy, and (what is as much valued in England as either that property or rank) to undermine the happineſs of the poor; to teach them that He, whom they venerate as a father, is in fact a tyrant; that the nobility, whoſe bounty and protection they have been in the habit of receiving, with bleſſings on their charity and munificence, are ſo many "*inferior deſpots*," who only withhold

from

from them their rights; that the parliament, by whom they are taxed, have no common intereſt with them; and that the *Conſtitution*, for which their anceſtors have bled, under the banners of thoſe princes and that nobility, (now held out to them as an oppreſſive incumbrance) and which they themſelves have often aſſerted *in fields not leſs glorious*, is a word, which we have *borrowed* from the French (for to the length of this abſurdity the author in queſtion puſhes his enthuſiaſm) and for which we have no exiſting ideas or principles in England to which the word admits of any application. If all this were true, a humane, a wiſe, or a moderate man would look to the remedy before he ventured to aggravate the affliction—He would think whether he could make men happy, before he taught them that they were miſerable—He would think what he had to offer for pride, and peace, and happineſs deſtroyed; and would not expect to be heard with patience if he tendered for actual reſpect abroad, for actuaf liberty enjoyed at home, for ſecurity both ol perſon and property, ſo eſtabliſhed that the loweſt individual can command all the power of the ſtate to prevent or vindicate the ſmal-

leſt violation of either; I ſay, he would not expect to be heard with patience, if he propoſed to a nation to barter theſe ſolid enjoyments for a metaphyſical delineation of liberty, or the political problems of any ſophiſtical theoriſt; even ſupported by the example of a nation now only in the criſis of the experiment, and perhaps at the eve of a civil war, or of being a prey to fifty foreign invaders. There is nothing tempting to us in this example—We do not wiſh to change our ſecurity or repute in Europe for that of France. Our nobles and our parliament do not wiſh to make ſoldiers of half the nation, and aſſaſſins of the reſt; to tear them from their families, from their peaceable and lucrative trades and callings, to be butchered alternately in wars of conqueſt, or in political maſſacres inſtigated by individuals for the gratification of their own vices, intereſts, or paſſions; and the people do not wiſh to ſhake off the protection of a king whom they adore, of a miniſter whom they reſpect, and of a parliament which they know to be able and ready to reſtrain *either*, if they changed their diſpoſition and forgot the duties of their ſituation; and which has hitherto laid no one burden upon the nation without

without laying the ſame directly upon themſelves, even in a proportion unexampled in the hiſtory of former times. Theſe, Sir, are ſome of the "*bubbles*" which make the people of England love and enjoy what the reſt of the world had hitherto agreed to venerate, perhaps to envy, the Britiſh Conſtitution. Theſe are the "*bubbles*," which, joined to the national character produced by that conſtitution, will continue to make the Engliſh name reſpected, as it is, for every great and good quality wherever it is known; and, I truſt, will keep them contented and happy at home independent of the theories, and in ſpite of the attempts of any incendiaries. It is not then the danger of our author's pamphlet, it is not the ſeduction of his metaphyſics, nor even the captivating example of the preſent ſtate of France that can provoke any reply; but it is the reſentment which glows in the breaſt of every Engliſhman againſt the attempts of an inſidious incendiary, who tries to diſturb the tranquillity of the poor, and to undermine the happineſs of a whole nation. Though I mean to inveſtigate, to anſwer, and to expoſe ſome of his moſt important poſitions, and to deſcend into the fair field of ſtrict ar-

gument, I cannot do ſo without a proviſo reſpecting the light in which my adverſary deſerves to be conſidered. An Atheiſt deſerves to be anſwered for the ſake of others; for himſelf, he deſerves only to be excluded from ſociety: a public incendiary, for the ſame reaſon, deſerves only deteſtation and puniſhment, however he may deſerve, for the ſake of thoſe whom he has attempted to miſlead, to be refuted: and I aſſure the gentleman, whoſe pamphlet has given riſe to theſe remarks, that if I do not deal about me the terms of idiot and madman ſo liberally as he has uſed them, reſpecting a perſon about whoſe genius and knowledge I venture to ſay there do not exiſt two opinions in England, and I mean to do them juſtice without partiality, it is much more from heſitating about the decency of uſing ſuch expreſſions, than from any doubt about the propriety of their application.

It is a melancholy thing to eſtimate the depravity of the human heart, and to view the utmoſt pitch of malignity to which it has ever mounted; to read the ſhocking calendars which our own tribunals, or thoſe of other countries afford, of poor and aged inhumanly treated,

treated, of huſbands and wives, of parents and children, maſſacred by each other; of murderers with refined, and more than ſavage cruelty, returning to view, and to encreaſe the ſufferings of their victims; and yet to think, that all this is little, compared to the height to which human malice and human iniquity can riſe—to think that it is poſſible for any man to ſee a river, at which the rich drink for health and luxury; from which the poor draw their life, and ſtrength, and comfort; that invigorates their hearts, and fertilizes their fields; that recompenſes every fatigue and qualifies every diſguſt; that year after year has afforded refreſhment to the exhauſted, and never been reſorted to without ſucceſs. I ſay, to think that it is poſſible for a man, with cool and deliberate malignity to attempt to poiſon the ſource of ſuch a ſtream, to watch with anxiety for the firſt ſymptoms of diſguſt, to be at hand to aggravate the firſt moments of ſuffering and torment, and to wait with impatient cruelty, but deliberate malignity, for the convulſions and expiring agonies of a whole people. Yet this, and more than this, is the degree of malignity which enters into the deſign of the pamphlet I am conſidering;

I mean ſtrictly ſpeaking, and without the ſmalleſt exaggeration from any metaphorical illuſtration. The book in queſtion would not be worth an anſwer, if the view with which it is written admitted of aggravation; and I ſhould not condeſcend to employ my time upon the abſurd and ridiculous theories with which it abounds, if the *object* of the author did not ſtrike my heart preciſely in the light I have repreſented it. But, it is the fact, that to the Britiſh Conſtitution, ſuch as it is, do the higher orders in our ſtate owe all their conſequence, and independence, and pride, and greatneſs of power in doing good: it is the fact, that to the Britiſh Conſtitution, ſuch as it is, do the poor owe their liberty, their protection, their independence, their ſecurity, their power of reſtraining and puniſhing the rich whenever they deviate either in private or in public from the duties of their ſituation: it is the fact, that under the general courſe of labour, or the caſual affliction of any oppreſſion, the poor do bleſs themſelves in bearing the name of Engliſhmen, and do conſider that character as the remedy of many, and the alleviation of every misfortune. —To deſtroy and embitter this ſource of

comfort,

comfort, to poiſon a mother's milk, is the object of the pamphlet in queſtion.—This is the miſchief propoſed, and more than this, (ſo much does the ſtrict fact exceed the illuſtration) *inaſmuch as a life of political freedom and ſecurity is a greater and more valuable poſſeſſion than the mere circumſtance of bare exiſtence.*

Let us, however, analyze the ingredients of this poiſon; and ſee, with gratitude to the great Ruler of the univerſe, how miſchief, horrid and tremendous in its malignity, may become contemptible in the impotence and imbecillity of its execution. What are the wretched theories that it is hoped will agitate and convulſe a great and enlightened nation? Firſt, Sir, let us examine ſtrictly *that* reſpecting the Equality of Mankind. If it is meant by this expreſſion, that the perſon of the poor is *equally* ſacred with that of the rich, or of thoſe in the higher orders; that his property, whatever it may be, is *equally* ſacred; that his rights ought to be protected by ſanctions *equally* ſtrong; the principle is juſt; is conformable to common ſenſe; and is practically aſſerted in the Britiſh Conſtitution, in a degree unknown in any republic, ancient or modern,

modern, or in any other form of government whatever—*and ſo far has not the leaſt degree of novelty in it:* but if more than this is meant, as may well be ſuſpected by the pompous promulgation of this new revelation, the authors of it cannot advance one ſtep in illuſtrating their idea, or make any one attempt at explanation that does not immediately reſolve itſelf into abſurdity: for, does it mean that all the poor or the lower orders have equal right to equal conſequence and government in the ſtate? and that all the rich or higher orders have a reciprocal duty and obligation to ſubmit themſelves to the exerciſe of their menial offices and profeſſions? Does it mean that the cobler and the king ſhould work at their ſeveral callings by rotation? Does it mean that the labourer who tills the ground with the ſweat of his brow, and the proprietor of ten thouſand acres to whoſe greatneſs he thus contributes, ſhould occaſionally change hands? Or that another remedy ſhould be adopted for this inequality, by an equal diviſion of all the land in every kingdom? Or is the principle a little better laid, and to provide againſt the abſurdities directly reſulting from it; namely, that of expoſing the wiſe to be

governed

governed by the fooliſh; the inſtructed by the ignorant; and the weak to labour for the ſtrong; is there a notable deſign behind, for the promulgation of which the preſent age is not yet ſufficiently enlightened? Is the plan really to *equalize mankind*, that an equal diſtribution of every thing may in reality be equal? Let us pauſe a little to conſider in what manner, and by what means alone theſe reformers are to counteract the unequal diſpenſations of Providence.—For it muſt be meant either that mankind as aſſembled in ſociety, or as found or ſuppoſed in a ſtate of nature, are in a ſituation to adopt and to enjoy this equality; or that ſome means may and ought to be uſed to make them ſo.—Of the firſt of theſe ideas; no man opens his eyes without ſeeing the falſhood manifeſted beyond a poſſibility of doubt; without ſeeing that ſuperior endowments of bodily ſtrength, of mental qualities or mental attainments, have and do, under all circumſtances whatever, and in all degrees and ſtages of civilization, commanded ſuperior conſequence, reſpect, power, and ſituation; and have, I will not ſay merely *impaired*, but directly *ſubverted* and *annihilated* this theory of natural equality. How then is

this

this imperfection in the order of the univerſe to be rectified? Are the conſtitutions of the ſtrong to be impaired to reduce them on a level with the weak? Are thoſe of ardent minds and great natural faculties to be chilled and kept back by every ſpecies of bad education, and the dwarf and tender plants to be forced in a hot-bed, that each may bear, though neither perhaps good for much, their *equal* fruit in due ſeaſon? Since the days of Procruſtes and his bed, ſo prepoſterous an idea of equalizing mankind never entered into the human imagination; and yet I defy the moſt metaphyſical theoriſt to advance one ſtep beyond the firſt idea I have ſtated of equality, *which has been for ages eſtabliſhed in the Britiſh Conſtitution*, without running upon one or other of theſe abſurdities. Really, Sir, if this idea was not to be propagated by the convulſion of a great empire, if it was not to be inculcated by fire and ſword, by tortures and the lamp-poſt; if one did not ſee, going along with theſe doctrines, all the cruel effects of infant tyranny in low hands, it would be impoſſible to view this new ſyſtem of civic diſcipline without laughing: to ſee an Eveque D'A——, or an Abbé S——, at the head of

his

his ſchool, cultivating and improving, forcing in hot beds the plants of ſlow and unkindly growth; and thwarting, chilling, and pruning thoſe whom heaven has bleſſed with propenſity to luxuriant vegetation. Sir, the friend of humanity and reaſon would ſmile with indignation and contempt at this philoſophical enterpriſe; the enemies of France would laugh with exultation and triumph to ſee the pupils of this academy turned out to rival the glories of a Henry IV. a Luxembourg, or a Sully. Ridiculous and abſurd as this idea of equality is, in every ſenſe alluded to, it admits of no other—It muſt mean either equal enjoyment of all rights; or that men come, or are ſuppoſed to come, with equal rights and pretenſions into ſociety; and that it is the buſineſs of a conſtitution to create and realiſe this idea of equality, which certainly has no exiſtence in the order of the univerſe, and which never yet was found either in a ſtate of nature, or in any ſociety.

The next reproach upon our Engliſh form of government is, that we maintain our firſt functioner in the ſtate, to uſe the cold and abſtract name for king and father, at too great an expence; and this is *inſinuated*, (for

no man dare *aſſert* it,) as being peculiarly matter of reproach to the Engliſh nation in regard to the two houſes of Orange and Brunſwick. The difficulty, in regard to this ſubject, is to know within what bounds to contain the anſwer: *Firſt*, in regard to the diſreſpect with which this gentleman chuſes to treat his majeſty's perſon, family, and electoral dominions, let me aſk what light does the extent of Hanover throw upon the theory of the Britiſh conſtitution? *Secondly*, Should we have done better to have limited the ſucceſſion to ſome great and powerful rival monarch? or, Should we have done better to have made the crown an object of domeſtic contention and civil war among all our own nobles, and, according to this new ſyſtem of equality, for every individual in the country who choſe to aſſert his equal pretenſions to the ſupreme government of his country? Or, conſiſtently with the idea of an hereditary monarchy, only ſubject to change or choice under peculiar circumſtances, have we not done beſt to take the only family to which thoſe principles, conſiſtently with the ſecurity of our religion and liberty, pointed us?—whereby we excluded

the idea of election, and therefore of competition; conſequently of inceſſant ſtruggles for ſucceſs, or to retrieve diſappointment; of civil war; of princes governing half their ſubjects by conqueſt; and of people obeying by ſubjection; at the ſame time we fortified the principles of the conſtitution, and maintained the religion and freedom of the country: introducing, moreover, a race of princes eminent in Europe for their virtues, (which is, and long has been, the fact reſpecting the houſe of Brunſwick) and under whom the commerce, the power, the liberty of Great Britain, has been cultivated and advanced to a pitch unknown in former ages. But, is it at this time that I am to explain and vindicate the principles of the revolution and the acts of ſucceſſion?—As a matter of *theory* I have already condeſcended too far upon this ſubject; as a matter of *experience*, which we are invited to renounce, the ſhort anſwer is—that we are ſo well ſatisfied with the conſequence of thoſe regulations, and of that great event in our hiſtory, and ſo happy both in the liberty enjoyed at home, and the repute and credit of the Britiſh conſtitution abroad,

abroad, that there is ſcarce one of us who would not *die* to maintain it.

I cannot help taking notice of the meanneſs and malice with which the period of the Hanover ſucceſſion is choſen, as the date from which the diminution of our ſpecie may be calculated.—Does the author pretend what he inſinuates, that, *even if his ideas were juſt upon this ſubject*, he can make a cauſe and effect out of theſe cotemporary facts? Why then is not the period of fifty years before, or fifty after that period, taken as the date? Has any one *change* taken place ſince that period in our ſyſtem of commerce and finance that is not confeſſedly an *improvement?* Why then this baſe and mean inſinuation? Why? but with the hopes of raiſing an unfounded prejudice, of blaſting the pride and happineſs which the people have long felt, and hope long to feel, in being governed by his majeſty and his deſcendants.—Facts, Sir, are ſtubborn things in the way of a theoriſt. Mirabeau ſaid of the Abbé Seyes, that when he ſhewed you his political charts, all appeared plain ſailing; neither ſhoals, nor ſands, nor rocks, nor any of the great boun-

daries

daries of nature, were marked; but when you begun your voyage upon his authority, you ſtill found the river that could not be navigated; the rock and the mountains that could not be traverſed; the great obſtacles which God and nature had interpoſed, and which could not be ſurmounted. The gentleman, whoſe pamphlet I am conſidering, is always a theoriſt when he is not an incendiary. His ideas of practice are wholly confined to miſchief. Metaphyſics are not inflammable; and all the ſophiſms of pedantry together will never make a revolution in England. But, Sir, I will oppoſe this gentleman's theory with facts and with reaſoning; and will alſo inform him what are the feelings of the people whoſe paſſions he wiſhes to inflame, whoſe judgment he tries to pervert, and whoſe happineſs he labours to deſtroy. We think, Sir, that having ſecured the liberty of the ſubject, having provided that he ſhall be governed by known laws, made by perſons of his own direct choice, or who have a common intereſt with him; having provided that the rights of the loweſt, whatever they may be, in reſpect of his perſon and property, ſhall be equally

ſacred with thoſe of the higheſt; that a monarchy, with theſe limitations, is the moſt eligible form of government; that the executive power is beſt in a ſingle hand; that negotiation, and the determination of war and peace, is alſo beſt in a ſingle perſon, acting by the advice of a few reſponſible miniſters. We have no reaſon, when we contemplate the great and illuſtrious perſons who have, in all times, puſhed themſelves to the higheſt honours by ſerving the ſtate; when we ſee literature encouraged, and our manufactures and commerce urged to a greater height than in any other known country, we have no reaſon to think that genius is cramped, or the public ſervice thwarted by the reſtraints and ſubordinations incident to ſuch a monarchy: when we contemplate the endleſs contentions, the ſhort duration of republics; the vexatious ſlavery endured, as often as thoſe contentions have ended either in the eſtabliſhment of an oligarchy, or the tyranny of any popular leader, we have no reaſon to repent of not having choſen a finer theory of liberty, but one leſs practical, leſs ſecure, and leſs ſuited to the nature of man, and his exigencies in civil

life. We prefer an hereditary monarchy to one that is elective, for reaſons equally ſolid; and now endeared to us by the ſovereigns it has brought us, and which we truſt it will bring us, of the houſe of Brunſwick. We have weighed the alternative which the imperfect ſtate of human nature offers to our deciſion in this reſpect: the contentions, the civil wars, the rebellions, the caballing in the ſucceſsful candidate to reward his partiſans, to ſecure the ſucceſſion in his family, or to aggrandize that family at the expence of the crown, and of the public; all the manifeſt evils with which an elective monarchy is pregnant. On the other hand, we know that hereditary ſucceſſion expoſes us to the being ruled by princes of various degrees of mental attainments, and moral qualities; in ſhort, to the government of ſuch as would not probably have been the objects of an election. We do not heſitate to prefer the latter riſque to the former certainty of miſchief; *ſecured* as we are by this weighty and ſolid aſſurance, that a Britiſh king is happy and powerful only in proportion as he is good and popular; that all the ties of nature, as well as duty, bind him to educate his ſuc-

ceſſor in the knowledge of this truth; and *bleſſed* as we are, by a conſtitution, under which our liberties, perſons, and properties, are ſecure, independent of the virtues, and in ſpite of the vices of any ſovereign. Theſe are the reaſons which render the power of our crown the boaſt of the nation; theſe are the reaſons which make us proud of ſaying, that no monarch upon earth is more powerful than our ſovereign. Our loyalty, affection, and obedience, conſtitute our monarch's power; we give them in proportion to *his* virtues and regard for his people; and when we tell him we are moſt devoted to him, we make at once the beſt uſe of our conſtitutional freedom, and the beſt panegyrick on his government. What has the theoretical enemy of hereditary ſucceſſion to oppoſe to this? Can he ſecure that the man moſt fit to govern, ſhall have moſt voices at the election? Can he ſecure that no man leſs worthy, perhaps moſt unworthy, ſhall poſſeſs the talent of diſplaying aſſumed virtues, of concealing vices, of captivating the public with deluſive hopes and expectations from his government? Can he enſure either that the beſt will be choſen; or that, if he is choſen, he will *afterwards*, by his conduct, confirm

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the propriety of his election? Where there is contention, there is hoſtility; and hoſtility in numbers, about the choice of a ſovereign, is civil war. Where then is the chance that either the beſt or the worſt will be choſen without contention? that the contention will be carried on without bloodſhed, or end without rancour? that diſappointed hopes of royalty will ſubſide into loyal obedience to a ſucceſsful rival? Is it, on the other hand, to be expected, that he who ſucceeds in ſuch a conteſt will make the good of his people the ſole rule of his government? Is it to be expected, that in human nature we ſhall find that heterogeneous compound of good and bad qualities that will equally forget the ſervices of friends, and the hoſtilities of enemies; that will act towards both with the equal temper of a firſt magiſtrate, free from favoritiſm as from reſentment; and that will, from public virtue, ſo far reſtrain the natural ſuggeſtions of private duty, as not to attempt improperly to favour his friends, to ſecure the ſucceſſion to his own family, or to aggrandize that family at the public expence? He can ſecure *no one* of theſe points. Men may be rendered diſcontented and unhappy by contemplating an ideal paradiſe, a purer theory

of liberty than ever exiſted, but when a new government comes to be eſtabliſhed, it will be felt that men are men ſtill; of imperfect natures, of ardent and uncertain minds, which baffle metaphyſical calculation; that they have been ſent into the world with paſſions, certain without government, to daſh the bark againſt every ſhoal and rock, and fitted with due liberty, reſtraint, and encouragement, to carry them to every great and glorious enterpriſe. We ſhall therefore ſtill continue zealous in our loyalty to a limited, hereditary monarchy—and, Sir, as little as we are diſpoſed to prefer an elective to an hereditary monarchy, ſo little, and ſtill leſs are we willing to degrade the character of our monarch, and to adopt the new Idea of his office. We will not change the name of monarch, for that of firſt ſervant of the ſtate—we will not change the ſtrong protection, the anxious cares of a father, for the cold official duty of a *firſt functioner*; we will not change the zeal, the duty, the allegiance of affectionate ſubjects, for the cold and reluctant obedience of inſolent and ſuſpicious employers. But if a liberal and faithful *heart* ſpurns at this degradation of his ſovereign, an enlightened

lightened *mind* does not reject it with leſs contempt. Where is its foundation in reaſon? Is it becauſe there are obligations the moſt binding to the faithful diſcharge of functions the moſt important between a ſovereign and his people? Is it becauſe there are duties belonging to the office of a king, which his ſubjects may juſtly expect to ſee fulfilled, that he is to be degraded into a ſervant? or they erected into his maſters and employers? The character of a father, in domeſtic life, has duties the moſt ſacred, the moſt inviolable, the moſt obligatory; and yet who ever dreamt of teaching, that the father was only the *firſt functioner* of the family? We know that a father may treat his children with various degrees of parental tenderneſs and care: we know that he may ſo far forget his nature and his duty, as to treat them with unkindneſs, indifference, and ill uſage; they will feel ſufficiently for themſelves when attachment muſt ceaſe, and when obedience itſelf would be no longer a virtue; but curſed be he that ever *defines* a father's functions, that reduces filial piety to a mathematical parallel of reciprocity; that ſhall deſtroy the father's affection, and the

childrens ſenſe of duty; that ſhall make the two beſt energies of the human mind a matter of calculation, and thus root up the nobleſt dependencies and deareſt connexions of ſocial life. We believe that the princes of the houſe of Brunſwick do feel an anxious and parental care for the welfare, the liberty, and the proſperity of the people they govern; and let me caution the author of the pamphlet in queſtion, not to reckon upon his theorems againſt the loyalty of an Engliſhman to his preſent ſovereign; let me tell him, what I ſincerely believe, that though the Engliſh are not apt to be ſhocked by any thing that can take the ſemblance of free diſcuſſion; that though a generous contempt of unſucceſsful miſchief, of impotent hoſtility, and humanity even towards the guilty, be parts of their character, yet that ſo dear is his Majeſty to his ſubjects, that the perſon of his libeller would ſcarce be ſafe in any village of the kingdom where his ſcurrility had been made known. I proteſt I think ſo; and though I truſt that no injury, that no inſult, that no provocation, would ever tempt an Engliſh mob to apply the lamp-poſt even to thoſe who are moſt convinced

of

of its efficacy, and of the regularity with which juſtice is adminiſtered *by it*; yet I really believe there are few places in England where the author in queſtion would eſcape without the pump and the horſe-pond, if he ſhould dare to propagate in perſon the ſeditious ſcurrilities he has publiſhed againſt our ſovereign and his illuſtrious houſe.

Having alluded to certain popular puniſhments in England, in the comparative *lenity* of which I own I have a double pleaſure from having, in general, no great confidence in their *juſtice*, let me take this opportunity of making one remark upon our author's defence of the dreadful executions which have polluted the ſtreets of Paris. Every good, every able, every reſpectable Frenchman, of whatſoever party he may be, reflects on them with horror, with ſhame, and with repentance. It is, perhaps, not ſaying too much, that ſo ſhocking to humanity, ſo repugnant to every feeling and principle of civilization have they been, as literally to have changed the ſentiments of all Europe in regard to the French character. It was reſerved for the cold theory of an Engliſhman to *juſtify*, what every honeſt Frenchman wiſhed not to be *vindicated*, but

forgotten.

forgotten. The murder of thoſe who would barely have defended their maſter and their king, when *his* life was at ſtake; the maſſacre of others on *ſuſpicion* only of attachment to the *ſame* cauſe; the proceſſion of a father's bleeding head to meet his ſon, for whom a ſimilar fate was preparing, ſpreading, as that proceſſion did, from the horrors attending it, abortion and death throughout the land; the people not only making human ſacrifices, but ſqueezing the heart of the victim, and drinking the blood with more than ſavage barbarity; the ſhocking outrages to decency; the wanton and nameleſs brutalities that attended the death of other ſufferers, together with the mercileſs affliction of their neareſt relations; theſe are all nothing in the eye of a philoſopher. Still, however, for thoſe not quite ſo enlightened, ſome juſtification is attempted, and we are referred, *for a precedent*, to the puniſhment of the rebels after the laſt rebellion, in 1745. The gentleman forgets a few of the leading differences in the two caſes. Thoſe unfortunate perſons were puniſhed not for *loyalty*, but for *treaſon* to the king; for attempting to ſubvert, not to maintain the *eſtabliſhed monarchy* of the country;

try; for deſpiſing the mercy of the crown before ſhewn to them and their families, and not for fearing the violence of a rebellion. They were alſo *tried* before they were puniſhed; they were judged by the known laws of the land, and executed by the legal officers of juſtice. Theſe are, in truth, juſt the circumſtances which conſtitute the difference between murder and legal puniſhment. Not one of theſe circumſtances has occurred in the preſent caſe to draw the line between cruelty and puniſhment; to mark the difference between juſtice and murder; to make the death of thoſe unfortunate victims, who have ſuffered in France, either matter of juſtice to themſelves, or of example to others. But, Sir, is it really meant, that this *code of penal laws* ſhould make a part of the *New Rights of Men?* Is it indifferent, whether offences are *previouſly declared?* Whether criminals are *tried?* whether their guilt is *proved?* and whether juſtice is done upon them by individuals, the populace, or the *officers of juſtice?* Or are the populace to be at once legiſlators, judges, and executioners of laws made, or rather declared, in the hotteſt moments of popular ferment againſt

ideal

ideal crimes, unknown in the ſtate; and to puniſh actions previouſly committed, under the allowance and protection of the laws? Actions, moreover, for the moſt part, which deſerve the name of loyalty, patriotiſm, and merit, and which it is degrading them to qualify merely with the deſcription of being innocent? This is indeed to *realiſe*, and to *aggravate* all the miſeries which anarchy can produce. It is not enough to change all the principles of government, to ſubvert all the orders of the ſtate, to give to thoſe who are to be governed more power than to their rulers, to teach them to conſider their ſovereign as a ſervant, to be employed by them with jealouſy and diſtruſt, that in his nature he *muſt* have views repugnant to their wiſhes, and inimical to the liberties and happineſs of his ſubjects; it is not enough, by theſe principles, to lay the foundation of endleſs diſcontents and confuſion, of weakneſs in the government, and violence in the people; of perpetual commotions and wars, both foreign and domeſtic; in ſhort, of all the miſeries into which the idea of anarchy may be reſolved: but the executive power, as to the puniſhing of crimes againſt the

public,

public, is deliberately, and upon ſyſtem, to be lodged in the loweſt orders of the people, in the very moments of civil commotion. The frenzy of an inhuman mob is to be legaliſed and commended, their horrid barbarities are to be juſtified, and a repetition of them is to be encouraged, not by pardon, not by palliation, but by a deliberate compariſon (in which, moreover, theſe enormities are eminently preferred) with the penal code and legal execution of juſtice, in one of the moſt enlightened nations upon earth. What have the French yet done to any Engliſhman, in all their enormities, to deſerve this baneful theory being propagatted among them? From what provocation, upon what motives of reſentment, does he let looſe this hydra upon them, and, by a cold deliberate juſtification of all the horrid barbarities which have attended the revolution, endeavour to inſtigate the renewal of them in France, and the imitation of them throughout Europe? And here let me point out a ſtriking difference between the enthuſiaſm of Mr. Burke and of his antagoniſt, as it appears in their ſeveral works. If Mr. Burke errs, he errs on the ſide of order; and his errors are calculated to promote

mote the peace and happineſs of mankind; if his enthuſiaſm leads him to exaggeration, he celebrates, perhaps, with exaggeration, the pity and reſpect due to *fallen* greatneſs; the virtues of a *captive king*, and of a *degraded and inſulted queen*. The love of order, the love of government, the reſpect of fixed principles, the ſcrupulous tenderneſs and anxiety of a *practical* philoſopher for the *actual* liberty and happineſs of mankind, joined to a loyal and ardent zeal for the Britiſh conſtitution, theſe, I ſay, are the biaſes which lead, and ſometimes perhaps miſlead, the fervent genius of the *former* to enthuſiaſtic repreſentation. The direct reverſe of all theſe feelings, the love of anarchy, the deteſtation of government, the contempt of fixed principles, the coldneſs and indifference of a theoriſt, ſenſeleſs to the actual miſeries of mankind, joined to an envy and hatred of every thing which bears the name of Britiſh, theſe are ingredients which make up, I will not ſay the enthuſiaſm, (I will not ſo far degrade its character,) but the cold and perſevering malignity of the *latter*, labouring, by inceſſant perverſions, to undermine the content of every community; and working, with impla-

implacable enmity, againſt the happineſs and tranquillity of mankind. The world will reſpect the errors of the one, while they deteſt even the reaſoning of the other: not that the wretched ſophiſms I am anſwering deſerve that name—But it is more my buſineſs to expoſe thoſe ſophiſms than to enter a conſideration of Mr. Burke's book—particularly as I wiſh, at preſent, in this letter, not to give any opinion whatever of the French revolution, any farther than concerns merely the particular circumſtances to which I have alluded.—But to conclude this head in a few words—In vain is this attack made on our juriſprudence; in vain is capricious violence offered to us as a better guardian than firm ſecurity; our liberties are *at leaſt* as *great* as thoſe propoſed by the conſtitution, and rather *more freely* enjoyed; our perſons and our properties are *at leaſt* as ſecure as thoſe of any perſon in France; be aſſured then, that we ſhall not eaſily change the protection of the habeas-corpus act, the acute and learned judgment of an upright Engliſh judge, protecting the ſubject with all his learning and ability; the caution and inflexible integrity of an Engliſh jury; the accuracy and anxious

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benevolence of a recorder's report; the tenderneſs of his Majeſty deliberating in counſel upon that report; theſe are ſome of the ſafeguards of juſtice, of liberty, and of right, which, I ſay, we ſhall not eaſily be perſuaded to exchange for Jack Cade's law, executed by our rioters of 1780, or by the jacobins of 1792.

The next order of our ſtate I have to defend, is one which has often defended every other order of the ſtate, and of which the hiſtory would be its beſt defence—I mean the order of hereditary nobility. Whether our author makes this attack as a *neceſſary* part of his attack upon the monarchy, or whether he thinks that a monarchy can ſubſiſt without any gradation of orders in the ſtate, is a point which he does not venture to explain: I will drive him to the laſt extremity of a ſophiſt by the neceſſity of ſtanding on plain grounds of reaſoning, upon ſtated facts and explained principles. Does he then mean that monarchy is bad, and *therefore* nobility, its neceſſary offſpring and ſupport, is alſo bad? If he does, it is ſufficient to juſtify our monarchy in order to vindicate the inſtitution of our nobility. Or does he mean that monarchy ſhould exiſt without

without an order of nobility, and without any gradations in ſociety? If he does, he means what is repugnant to reaſon, and what hiſtory proves to be incompatible with the ſecurity of the ſovereign, the liberty of the ſubject, and every idea of permanency either in the government or conſtitution. Let him look to the countries where there *is no* gradation between the ſovereign and the loweſt ſubject, whether this ſpecies of government be the offspring or the parent of ſlavery; he will always find that they exiſt together, inſeparably connected, and will trace *in it* the prolific and never-failing ſource of rebellion, tyranny and confuſion. He will find the ſame, if he looks to the republics, where, from the accidental greatneſs of particular individuals, the ſame ſort of monarchy has ariſen, and where ideas of freedom were previouſly general and well underſtood. What is metaphyſical nonſenſe, oppoſed to the experience and received opinion of the moſt enlightened part of mankind? "That one can have no idea of a baron, a viſcount, an earl, or a duke"—I have a very diſtinct idea of what they *ſhould be*; and, believe, I find no difficulty in illuſtrating it by what they are. I can, without any ſtretch

of the underſtanding, comprehend the making the executive power the rewarder of merit: I can with as little difficulty or exertion, comprehend the wiſdom of holding out *honour* as its beſt reward; and, conſequently, with a clear and diſtinct idea of what I mean, can conſider the king as the fountain of power; I can ſuppoſe him adviſed either to withhold theſe honours from the deſerving, or to laviſh them upon the unworthy; but I can as eaſily ſuppoſe him diſpoſing of them in every degree to animate the loyalty, to encourage the exertions, to reward the ſervices and the merits of his ſubjects. Neither is it more difficult to defend the inſtitution of hereditary honours; but really, with the modern philoſophers, I muſt go back to firſt principles, of nature as well as politics. Our anceſtors found the neceſſity of providing a conſtant ſucceſſion of perſons educated in the principles and the ſciences which the nature of the times required; and calculated to ſucceed their fathers in the conduct of our armies, their readineſs to ſupport or to reſtrain the crown, to protect or curb the people according to the circumſtances and juſtice of the caſe, and the exigencies of thoſe times. No man pretends that this was a light

a light duty, fit to be undertaken by any one without conſequence, without power, without ſuitable education. In ſhort, for *thoſe* times the reaſon and propriety of an hereditary nobility is not diſputed. Now let me aſk, whether the duties are leſs, or leſs difficult; or whether the ſervices have been leſs that have been rendered to the ſtate from the time of the reſtoration to the preſent? Who prevented the ſurrender of more power into the hands of Charles the Second, than ever his father had fought for? Was it the people? Had not the tyranny of puritaniſm, and the confuſion of the country ſo ſickened the people, both of a *republic, and of monarchy without nobles, and without a regular gradation in the ſtate*, that every thing would have been ſacrificed in the deluſive joy at his reſtoration, if the prudence and the patriotiſm of Lord Clarendon, and Lord Southampton, and the nobles who ſupported them, had not reſiſted? Who animated the reſiſtance of the people to the tyranny of James II. and ſacrificed their lives, not with any view of their own aggrandiſement, not with any motives of ambition? The nobles. Lord Eſſex acting with hereditary virtue, fell, ſtruggling for the liberty of

the people, as his father before him had fallen, fighting for the life and honour of his ſovereign. And Lord Ruſſell was beheaded, not becauſe he was the "deſpot," but the protector of the people. Are theſe inſtances ſingle? How did the other members of the houſe of peers act? Did thoſe, whoſe peculiar charge it is to preſide over the church, diſgrace their brethren, or conſider their high ſtation in any other light than as a bond of higher duty and obligation? Had the houſes of peers no ſhare in effecting the revolution? And was it in no degree owing to *their* temper, wiſdom, and weight, that the bleſſings of that revolution were ſecured to us without bloodſhed or confuſion? and that King William only acquired, not the *rights of conqueſt*, as is pretended, but the right of governing a free people by known laws, and of maintaining the liberty and conſtitution he had aſſiſted to eſtabliſh? But I will not attempt to detail the public ſervice of our nobility, performed either individually or collectively. Who ever reads the hiſtory of our country will find, that they have never, in critical times, neglected the high duties of their ſtation; he will find among them, in times of commotion or licentiouſneſs,

tiouſneſs, the moſt loyal ſupport of the crown; in times unfavourable to liberty, the moſt ſtrenuous and weighty protection of the people. Have we any reaſon to believe that thoſe who actually enjoy this high ſtation are degenerate; or are leſs loyal towards their princes, or more—I will not ſay deſpotic, for the laws will not allow them to be ſo; but more indifferent to the liberties of the people than their anceſtors? We are bleſſed with a prince whoſe pride is in the happineſs of his people, and whoſe power is in their love; whom no man living ſuſpects to harbour, even in his mind, a wiſh or a thought unfriendly to the liberties of his ſubjects; and towards whom the loyalty and affection of all parties, even in all our ſharp political contentions, literally realizes the maxim of the law, in ſuppoſing him incapable, in himſelf, of meaning, or of wiſhing, as well as of doing any wrong to his ſubjects. Under ſuch a prince the people want no protection but his own. They on their part are ſenſible of the bleſſings of ſuch government; they do not obey from fear but love; they do not meaſure out either their affection or ſupplies to an officer whom they dread and diſtruſt; but they grant *both* with

a liberal animated attachment to a prince whom they adore. The ſovereign alſo of ſuch a people, on his part, knows no ſupport ſo ſtrong as their affection. Theſe are the reaſons which exclude the ſame exertions in our preſent nobility, and the ſame proofs which former times afford us of their zeal and ſervices towards the conſtitution. But do the preſent times afford us no inſtances worth mentioning? Look to the abolition of protections, originating in themſelves, by which the doors of juſtice were thrown open; look to the journal of their privileges; compare them with thoſe of former times, and obſerve there the ſame ſpirit, utterly diſcontinuing every one privilege that could poſſibly interfere with the juſtice of the country or the liberties of the ſubject. Theſe are *facts* which make the people of England alſo attached to this part of the conſtitution; and I might add to this, that the general manner in which our nobility conduct themſelves towards their neighbours, towards their tenants, and towards the poor, does conciliate in the people at large an additional degree of individual reſpect and attachment. Private bounty and perſonal benevolence is at leaſt as good a ground of public

public opinion as the ſtigma of a nick-name; and the conduct of our nobility and gentry, at leaſt as good a teſtimony in their favour, as the ſenſeleſs cry of ariſtocrat can be againſt theſe orders. We, Sir, who have not yet ſo far purified the nature of that rational being called man, as to fancy that liberty of ſpeech conſiſts in the duty of circulating every imaginable ſeditious idea againſt every exiſting government, and purity of reaſon, in endeavouring to eradicate ſome of the beſt principles of the human heart, who do not feel ourſelves juſtified, by experience, in taking for granted that no bad ones exiſt in human nature, or can ever interfere with our metaphyſical ſpeculations; we, Sir, who content ourſelves with narrow ideas of our own nature, and with mere practical notions of what is good for us, think it our duty to make laws, and to provide numberleſs ſafeguards for the wanderings of human nature in every order and ſtate, to encourage the good and reſtrain the bad affections, and to enjoy with reverence a conſtitution which gives us happineſs. It is not in the power of any theoriſt to alter theſe ideas in our nation. He may, out of a large community, find ſome whoſe jealouſies

it may be but too eaſy to alarm, whoſe diſcontent it may be but too eaſy to foment. He may flatter himſelf with producing a meeting or two to celebrate the new rights of man with violence on the property of ſome, and with the deaths of a few other unfortunate individuals; in ſhort, with a very poor repreſentation in miniature of thoſe cruel effects of anarchy and confuſion which he would produce throughout the country. But here will his ſucceſs ſtop, with having occaſioned private miſery enough to appal the heart of a philoſopher, with confuſion enough to gratify the feelings of an incendiary; in ſhort, with miſchief enough to ſatisfy any thing, but the cold and relentleſs ſpeculations of an overweening theoriſt. We are not above putting hiſtory and fact in the front of all our political arguments and maxims; fortunate if our reaſon can clearly develope the exact cauſes of things, but too modeſt to prefer our ſpeculations to our experience, and too wiſe to quarrel with a conſtitution which has grown, by experience, out of the various wants and wiſhes of man in ſocial life, adapted to his nature, and in fact producing our own happineſs. We might, therefore, confine ourſelves

ſelves to this ſpecies of anſwer to all the objections againſt Great Britain. We might ſay we love our king becauſe, from the nature of his ſituation, if he conſults his own happineſs, our king loves us; we love our parliament, becauſe they have a common intereſt with ourſelves; we love our religion, becauſe inaſmuch as we follow its precepts it makes us good; we love our laws, becauſe in all caſes it is their object to adminiſter perfect and equal juſtice; we love our conſtitution, becauſe our conduct is free and our perſons and properties ſecure; and we love our country, becauſe it is reſpected for its character as well as its power, by every known nation, and becauſe *we are happy in it*.

Theſe, Sir, are no bad *apologies* for an Engliſhman's attachment to his country; they are *reaſons* why he ſhould be ſatisfied with the bleſſings and bounty of Providence, of a ſort which "comes home to the buſineſs and boſoms of men;" and are, to any one who conſiders what government is, that it is the regulation and protection of man in ſocial life, for his happineſs and good; who conſiders what man is, wild and weak, in a ſtate of nature, unable to give effect to his own good propenſities,

ſities, or to reſtrain the bad ones either of his neighbour or himſelf in his individual capacity; in ſhort, to any one who conſiders man as a real exiſting being, ſuch as we know him to be, and government as a practical thing meant for his uſe, regulation and defence, theſe apologies are, even to the ſtricteſt philoſopher as ſolid a ground, both of reaſon and ſentiment, as the ſubject can admit of; and as ſafe, at leaſt, to go upon, as any abſtraction of metaphyſics or any theorem of politics. But we need not confine ourſelves to ſuch an anſwer—we can meet upon paper the ſpeculations which we diſtruſt, and can render a reaſon of the faith and love that is in us towards our own inſtitution.

I have ſtated briefly why we prefer a monarchy to any other form of government; why we prefer an hereditary monarchy; why we think an order of nobility both good in itſelf and an eſſential appendage to a limited monarchy, neceſſary both to the maintenance of the crown and the protection of the people; that we have confidence in our parliament, and eſpecially in our houſe of commons, partly bscauſe they are our own choice (for choſen they are, and always will be, eſpecially in critical

tical times, according to the general ſenſe of the nation, notwithſtanding particular exceptions) and ſtill more, becauſe they have a common intereſt with thoſe whom they tax, and for whom they legiſlate: I ought, moreover, to add, that we admire the whole the more from this peculiar circumſtance in its conſtruction, that the ſeveral parts calculated for reciprocal reſtraint, controul, or ſupport, are ſo joined and connected together, as to produce a unity of action, not a jarring of intereſts; a temperate interference according to the bias and duties of their reſpective ſtations, free from contentions, jealouſy, or hoſtile operations (at leaſt of any duration) even when they diſagree; and producing in their *accord* the moſt grave, weighty, and reſpectable authority, by which a wiſe and enlightened people can poſſibly wiſh to be governed. I have alſo given a juſtification, from hiſtory, of our nobility; and, likewiſe, of its being hereditary: but in philoſophy, in the nature of man, a ſtill farther juſtification may be found. The care of children, both as to their education and advancement in life, is the natural propenſity, the very inſtinct of parents. I hope I am not required in this

letter

letter to go ſo far back in the diſcuſſion or proof of firſt principles, as to be obliged to prove the reaſons and the benefits of theſe propenſities, which we have hitherto accepted with gratitude, as the beſt guardian of human nature, and the beſt attribute of its being. If then education can at all contribute to forming men for the higher duties of civil life, to whom ſhould this education be given but to the children of thoſe who are now in the higher ſtations of life? Would the nobility of the preſent day attempt to inſtruct, either by precept or example, any accidental ſet of ſucceſſors impoſed upon them by the ſtate in the high principles and functions of their ſituations? Or is it ſuppoſed that education is nothing, or that the nobility themſelves, as a body, have not an eminent ſenſe of honour and loyalty, and an hereditary pride in that character, likely to influence the diſpoſition of their children? To ſome of theſe abſurd ſuppoſitions muſt the enemies of hereditary nobility be driven: thoſe who chuſe to ſay that education is nothing, I conſider as ſaying ſo much leſs than nothing, that to them I ſhall give no anſwer: life is too long to be waſted in barren and unproductive theories,

theories, and too ſhort to ſatisfy thoſe who would ſpend it in eternal cavils about firſt principles. On thoſe, therefore, who think parental feeling has not any effect, nor parental care any influence; who thinking the knowledge and worſhip of a deity nothing, pretend one moment that a "Civic Education," as it is called, is a full and ſufficient ſubſtitute even for religion; and yet the moment after, when it interferes with any other favorite doctrine, would deny both the neceſſity and efficacy of education altogether, I ſhall not waſte the ſmall portion of time which it may have pleaſed heaven to allot me on this ſide the grave, in giving any anſwer—

> Gods! were we born for nothing but to write?
> Has life no joys for us? Or, to be grave,
> Have we no friends to ſerve, no ſoul to ſave?

Is our talent well ſpent that is exhauſted in quibbling? Has life no duties to exerciſe our virtue, no joys to animate our grateful feelings to its author? Have we no public or private debts to diſcharge, and no ſpecific taſk chalked out to us by our creator? viz. to work out our ſalvation by a patient and humble exerciſe of every virtue, and by a meek

meek diſtruſt of our own nature and infirmities? Thoſe who heſitate about firſt principles, and who do not heſitate about ſubverting the duties and the virtues to which they lead, but in their conduct take their doubts for granted, would do well for themſelves and for mankind to pauſe a little upon theſe conſiderations. But I return to the argument; The only remaining ſuppoſitions are theſe—either that other perſons, not their own children, ſhould be educated by the nobility as their ſucceſſors, or that there is no characteriſtic principle of honour, or loyalty, or greatneſs of mind, or any thing elſe annexed to their inſtitution: the firſt of theſe conceits is really ſo ridiculous a project to ſubſtitute for hereditary ſucceſſion, that it does not deſerve a refutation; and the ſecond, if reaſon, fact, or analogy be referred to, will not appear to be much better founded. Thoſe who ſpeculate for the regulation of man would do well firſt to ſtudy the nature of mankind; thoſe who would ſubvert great eſtabliſhments, who would ſacrifice great bleſſings now enjoyed, and introduce much actual miſery as the reaſonable price of ſome future good to be obtained; if for a moment one can ſuppoſe they

they really mean any thing beſides the immediate miſchief they occaſion, are indeed moſt deeply bound to conſider for what beings they compoſe their theories. Man is neither an angel, a devil, nor one of the brutes of the creation. Man by his nature, beſides his reaſon and his paſſions, which influence his conduct, entertains prejudices, and contracts habits, and acts from both of them; the one anticipating and going *before*, the other coming *after* a good education; following, but following blindly the directions of reaſon. To ſet the prejudices on the ſide of truth is one of the great buſineſſes of education; and one of its beſt efforts is, that after certain principles are eſtabliſhed in the mind, it is eaſier and more natural for men to follow them habitually, than to float, and waver, or reaſon anew on every occurrence of life. That men, beſides what the force of education produces, (of itſelf an argument for hereditary ſucceſſion) ſhould familiariſe themſelves with the duties of their ſituation, and inſenſibly adopt the character expected of them, is the natural conſequence of theſe principles, and, in fact, what they are daily obſerved to produce. We obſerve the ſame thing in every profeſ-

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ſion, in every analogous ſituation of life. The profeſſion of arms is conſidered as the profeſſion of honour and of courage. It is not true, that honour or that courage is more the duty of a ſoldier than of a gentleman; or that individually it exiſts in any excluſive excellence in that profeſſion. But it is true, that in general a perſon would expect his ſon to learn a higher *ſenſe of honour* from an officer than from an attorney. In the ſame manner a high ſenſe of honour, a love of the crown as the fountain of honour, a reſpect of eſtabliſhment, and a zeal for the ſettled conſtitution derived from the permanency of their own intereſt in it, corrected, however, as it is in our country by the ſenſe of right and the love of liberty, are the prevailing characteriſtics to be expected and to be found in our nobility. It is not that ſome are not, (I truſt many are) to be found in other ſituations moſt eminently diſtinguiſhed for theſe great and noble qualities, unaſſiſted by any prejudices or bias of their ſtation; and, perhaps, among the nobility, ſome may be found, who, notwithſtanding them, are remarkable for the virtues which would be natural, or the vices which would be characteriſtic in another rank of life;

life; but particular exceptions do not impeach a general principle; and it is always to be remembered in ſpeaking of England, that when we talk of the peculiar duties of the ſeveral parts of our conſtitution, none are abſolved from a diſcharge of all the duties more peculiarly expected of the reſt. Thus when we conſider the peculiar duty of the Houſe of Commons, to guard the public treaſure and the public liberty, we ſhould think that duty ill diſcharged if it precluded them from a generous confidence in a beloved monarch, or infringed either upon their loyalty or their liberality. When we conſider the Houſe of Peers as inſeparably attached to the crown, and peculiarly bound to maintain it, we expect, beſides the high and generous ſentiments of an honourable nobility ſpread among our people, and ſo making a great ingredient in the maſs of our national character (one, and no ſmall advantage derived from this inſtitution of nobility); I ſay, we expect this attachment to the crown ſhould ſhew itſelf in giving the beſt advice for the intereſt of the people. We expect, that while it is ready to ſupport the prerogative of the crown againſt any temporary frenzy, or againſt the popular

violence which the democratic part of our conſtitution may be liable to produce, it ſhould alſo be ready to moderate the exceſſes of any imprudent monarch; and we have often praiſed its weighty and temperate interference to reſtrain the exceſſes of an ill-deſigning one, and to protect the liberty of the people: ſo alſo from the king, though we expect the vigour and the ſecrecy that any occurrence may require from the executive power being committed to a ſingle hand; yet far from regarding him with inceſſant jealouſy, we ſhould be hurt if we were not juſtified in conſidering our ſovereign as the firſt protector of our liberties, and if we did not believe him always anxious to reſort to the wiſhes of his people, and to the national council as his beſt adviſers. Thus, though reſpective poſts are allotted to each, the whole is united, and all are expected to act together; and hence ariſes the harmony of our conſtitution, the ſtrength of our government, and the happineſs of the people. Hereditary nobility does not reſt only upon the arguments I have before ſtated; beſides the providing for a well educated ſucceſſion, diſtinctions and honours being hereditary is found to give them a value, that nothing

thing elſe can give. The parents hope of benefiting, or fear of injuring his child, is a motive of action to be found in *nature*, if not in any *theory of politics*; and the idea of diſgrace or honour being entailed upon one's poſterity, rouſes ſo many feelings in the human breaſt, that it becomes the moſt powerful incentive which can be held out to the human mind. Alas! we have been forced to have recourſe to this principle, and to prove its efficacy both ways. The laws of attainder and forfeiture reſt upon no other foundation. When loſs of life would have been reckoned martyrdom, where public puniſhment would be reckoned a triumph, the fear of entailing poverty or obſcurity upon thoſe to ſucceed, has been found to ſtifle and ſuppreſs every other feeling of the human mind. Let that principle then which makes the ſtrong reſtraint and effectual puniſhment of the traitor and the rebel, conſtitute alſo the nobleſt incentive and juſt reward of the loyal and meritorious ſubject. While the bad citizen feels that he is going to fight againſt his own blood, while he feels himſelf reſtrained by ſomething to which neither his virtues can render him ſuperior, nor his vices inſenſible, by ſomething

which is ſtronger than either, let the good citizen feel himſelf encouraged by the ſame principles; let him entertain the hope of perpetuating the recollection of his merit, of entailing honour and advantage to his poſterity; let him feel the comfort of reflecting, that as he leaves to his children a ſtation dearly earned on his part, which they have only to maintain; ſo he leaves them both precept and an example to follow, which renders virtue eaſy, and degeneracy ſcarcely poſſible. Theſe are ſome of the general reaſons in favour of hereditary nobility. The holding out the ſtrongeſt poſſible incentive as the encouragement of merit, the advantage of having a ſucceſſion educated in the principles, and after the model of thoſe who have deſerved beſt of the ſtate, and the additional obligation under which the ſucceſſors muſt act towards the ſtate, not to be degenerate or to appear in a manner unworthy of their anceſtors. That theſe principles ſhould operate *univerſally*, however it may be wiſhed, is not to be expected; ſuffice it to ſay, that they are conſiſtent with reaſon and the nature of man; that they have a general tendency to produce the effects aſcribed to them, and that in point

of

of fact they are found generally to act in the manner I have mentioned. I will add a few words respecting the rights of primogeniture, which so much offend our reformers; though in truth the *necessary* consequence of such a monarchy and nobility as I have described, and therefore as such vindicated sufficiently already in the defence of those institutions; and certainly upon this topic it is not personal interest which disposes me particularly towards the present legal disposition of property, but if I must speak from interest, I will fairly own why I wish things to remain as they are; the little I have, according to the present laws, I have secure, and I wish to keep it so: I am neither so desperate a gambler as to be allured, by any temptation, to risk my all in a lottery for the chance *advertised* of possibly gaining a very great prize: I am not yet so vicious as to rob my brother in order to make a *juster* distribution of the family property, or to convulse an empire to gratify any miserable partial rapacity, or any overweening conceits of imaginary justice. First, in regard to the crown—I have given our reasons for being attached to a monarchy, for chusing that

monarchy to be hereditary; and the only alternative now remaining for our diſcuſſion is, whether the ſucceſſion ſhall be *divided*, whether it ſhall be left *unſettled* as a fit object of contention between the ſeveral ſons of the preceding monarch, or whether ſome one, *not the eldeſt*, ſhall be conſtituted the ſucceſſor. Theſe are all the poſſible ſubſtitutes for the courſe and right of primogeniture. The firſt of them, viz. that of dividing, produces directly a diſſolution of the empire; and the ſecond has indirectly the ſame tendency, with the addition of all the anarchy, bloodſhed, and political miſchief which muſt reſult from ſuch a conteſt; the third idea (viz. that of taking ſome one of the ſons, not the eldeſt) has indeed nothing to recommend it but its novelty. But we live in an age when even the moſt important rights of man, and the very principles of juſtice, are as liable to be changed and to be voted out of faſhion as an old coat. The *ſtare deciſis* ſuited very well the blindneſs of former times, but is a maxim that deſerves to be ſcouted in our enlightened age. Our anceſtors made our laws, and aſſerted our freedom, and fought our battles in the dreſſes of their day: time has changed thoſe

dreſſes

dreſſes for ſomething new, as the fancy of ſucceeding time, ſafely exerciſing itſelf in ſuch a field, has conſidered them ridiculous: but never did I expect to ſee old and eſtabliſhed principles of thought and action, inſtitutes which had ſtood the teſt of reaſon and of ridicule for ages, and from the days of Eſau and Jacob had prevailed throughout the world, diſcarded, with as little ceremony and as much contempt. Never, till within theſe few years, I ſay, was it thought that all laws, and rights, and principles of our anceſtors were as ſubject to fancy and variety as their dreſs, and fit to be treated with as much levity. We, however, who live in this bright age of philoſophy, are to aſſert our right of judging by rejecting the wiſdom of thoſe who have gone before us, and are to take the conduct of our anceſtors merely as an Iriſh hand-poſt, pointing out to us, which is *not* the road: we are to conſider every thing for ourſelves; we are to begin by doubting the exiſtence of a ſuperior Being; we are next to doubt his attributes, his providence, and ſuperintending care and interference with mankind: theſe, indeed, are points we need not dwell upon, for life would not be long enough *really* to conſider every thing; and upon *this ſubject* we have

only *not* to think as our anceſtors have thought, and to *take for granted* the reverſe of received opinions. We are next to doubt about the principles of loyalty, of obedience, of ſubordination; in ſhort, to reject all ideas of government which have been received for ages; and, laſt of all, we are now in the eighteenth century, to quarrel with the doctrine of primogeniture. Upon this ſubject it may be aſked, Why *ſhould* the ſecond or the third ſucceed in preference to the firſt-born? What better claim can any other ſet up? Whereas two obvious grounds of preference occur in behalf of the eldeſt; firſt, that in general the firſt-born will probably be of a fitter age to ſucceed to his father's functions and duties; ſecondly, that in his ſucceeding to his father, diſcontent (if that exiſts) at leaſt is not ſour by diſappointment; the ſecond and third ſons are not deprived of any proſpect of ſucceſſion they ever had, which *would* be the caſe were the eldeſt ſon's ſucceſſion liable to be defeated by the birth of any younger children.

This, perhaps, from ſome prejudices in favour of fraternal affection, perhaps from other tender feelings of nature, quite out of the way of a theoriſt, has pointed out the

firſt fruit of nuptial love as the repreſentative of the father, and his principal ſucceſſor and theſe reaſons, together with many others on the ſame ſubject, have been thought good ones in all ages, and by almoſt every country in the world. What I have ſaid of the right of primogeniture, in regard to the crown, is equally applicable to the nobility in regard to their titles; I proceed, however, to ſay ſomething more in reſpect of land, whether held by the nobility or others. In regard to the nobility, if it be right or natural that honours ſhould deſcend to the firſt born, the ſame reaſons apply to the deſcent of land—Together with rank and conſequence an intereſt and ſtake in the country ſhould alſo deſcend.—This conſideration of itſelf would be ſufficient ground for the right of the firſt born among the nobility, to lands, even if it were not ſupported by all the other arguments on which the doctrine of primogeniture depends. But is it meant, by the enemies of this right, ſeriouſly to apply the notions of equality to property, and to introduce ſuch an improved code of agrarian laws, as really to produce an equal diſtribution of property? If this *be* meant, let it be avowed; and then it will be evident what is meant to

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to be aſſerted, and what we have to deny; but do not give us the plauſible ſound of words that ſtand for no fixed idea, or of which the ſenſe is never intended to be adopted. Thoſe who ſeriouſly mean any thing by theſe new doctrines, but to make one half of mankind fearful, ſuſpicious, and inſecure in their enjoyments, and the other half reſtleſs, diſcontented, and miſerable under their privations; in ſhort, who have any other object in view than the unhappineſs of mankind, would do well to go to ſchool, and learn the foundations of rights, and the elements and firſt principles of government. Conſidering this queſtion as matter of *right*, is it doubted by any man, that the laws of property are, for the moſt part, matter of poſitive inſtitution? that every ſtate has a right to eſtabliſh what regulations may appear moſt for the general good; and that no individual can juſtly ſay, my *natural right* is taken from me by my father's land deſcending to my eldeſt, or my youngeſt, or any one of my brothers, whoſe occupation of it, it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, may be moſt beneficial to the ſtate; and, coming to the queſtion of expediency and public benefit, does any man think, I will

not

not ſay that it would be *better*, but that it would be *poſſible* for a ſtate to ſubſiſt, for men to remain in ſociety together, where an equality of ſucceſſion was eſtabliſhed, which muſt neceſſarily, in a very ſhort time, produce an equality of property? Such an equality, once eſtabliſhed, who would be able to afford, and how ſhould thoſe be choſen, to dedicate themſelves to the expences of learned education; of ſtudying the ſciences, and of qualifying themſelves for all the higher duties of ſocial life? Who would be diſpoſed, or how ſhould thoſe be choſen, to work, to labour in the lower, but not leſs neceſſary vocations of life? Would the baker feed, or the taylor cloath the artiſt, or the ſcholar, upon the credit of what advantage he might derive through the medium of the others proficiency and learning? I fear that all the books of political arithmetic that ever were compoſed, would not be able to ſtrike a balance, or to ſtate a currency in ſuch an account. With equality of property, various trades of the ſame rank may be carried on, and perhaps, in many caſes, the mutual neceſſities, conveniencies, and luxuries of life, reciprocally ſupplied; but with equality of

property, trades and profeſſions cannot both ſubſiſt. Commerce itſelf muſt be annihilated, except only in the caſe of moſt immenſe and unmanageable confederacies. The capital of the merchant, the bodily inactivity of the ſcholar, the ſtateſman, the lawyer, and the divine, all ſavour too much of previous inequality of property, to be compatible with this new code. To this is alſo to be added, what I conceive to be no ſmall objection, the total ſubverſion of all ſubordination, and the utter impoſſibility of all government, reſulting from this ſyſtem.

Theſe are ſome of the grounds on which the rights of primogeniture depend, and ſome of the miſchiefs that would attend the ſubverſion of thoſe rights, and the alteration of that ſyſtem. They are ſuch as have reconciled all ages and all countries to it, and as will, probably, long be thought ſufficient to ſupport it in England.

But to conclude: it may ſuit the genius of the French nation to deſpiſe the reaſon of former ages, to reject the wiſdom of all who have gone before them, and to fancy that it is one of the new rights of man, (conceived only by the genius of the preſent day, and

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to be enjoyed only by the preſent generation,) to aſſemble together, in one comprehenſive view, all that antiquity, and middle and modern hiſtory teach us, in reſpect to the government of mankind, and at once to decide on the weakneſs and barbariſm of every other age and country. With the ſame arrogance to anticipate and aſſume the knowledge of every future event or ſyſtem which futurity may give riſe to, or eſtabliſh, and to decide as dogmatically upon poſterity, as contemptuouſly upon every thing paſt or preſent, except their own momentary inſtitutions. It becomes *us*, however, an humbler, but not, on that account, a weaker or a leſs wiſe nation, to turn our experience to account, to profit both by the virtues and the vices, by the errors and the wiſdom of our anceſtors, to avail ourſelves of the experiments which have been made within our own knowledge, on our own ſoil; and not to repeat, on every idle ſuggeſtion, theſe *experimenta crucis*, to the deſtruction of the body politic, in ſearch of a philoſopher's ſtone, which never will be found, and which, if found, would make us neither greater, happier, or better than we are at preſent. I truſt we ſhall never forget

that

that this country *has had* its ſtruggles, and is in *actual poſſeſſion* of all that rational freemen can aim at. This country *has been* reſcued from tyranny without falling into anarchy; we *have fought* for our liberties, and have eſtabliſhed them upon the baſis of law and order; we *have had* our conflict, and *have* come off victorious and *unmaimed*. Our object then was to reconcile liberty and order in our people, to unite freedom and energy in our government; and neither the political credit and greatneſs of this country, nor the individual ſecurity, comfort, and happineſs of the people, actually enjoyed, lead us to think that we have failed in our attempt. I own there are few things which provoke me more in the ſyſtem I am combating, than the air of novelty and diſcovery with which ſome of its principles are affectedly recommended. It provokes me both from the arrogance of the fraud, and the miſchief of its tendency; but I truſt that every Engliſhman will diſtinguiſh between diſcovery of new, and the revival of *exploded* conceits; and will not take the refuſe of all men's reaſon for unattained excellence, or original conceptions.

We

We have eſtabliſhed our conſtitution on the nature of man, his exigencies in ſocial life, and on the wiſdom of ages. Our reaſon teaches us, (and, thank God, it is as yet to our reaſon and obſervation, and not to our own experience, that we owe the inſtruction) what ſort of animal *ungoverned man* is, in ſocial life. Alas! let us reflect, with gratitude for ourſelves, and with pity for our fellow-creatures, how many thouſands are now learning the nature and diſpoſition of man in ſuch a ſtate, by ſuffering all the wrongs and miſeries which refined malignity, with more than ſavage fierceneſs, can inflict! It alſo teaches us, that if government be neceſſary, it is no leſs neceſſary that its arm ſhould be ſtrong, and its power effectual, to the ends of its inſtitution. The ſame reaſon has taught us, that the abuſes of power may be prevented without its ſtrength being diminiſhed; and theſe principles, ſimple and obvious as they are, are in fact the baſis, and might eaſily be extended into an analyſis of the excellent, and hitherto unrivalled, conſtitution of Great Britain. But it is not becauſe the idea of a republic had not been diſcovered by us, that we have adopted that

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of a limited monarchy in preference to it. We had heard of the greateſt republics in ancient times, (times leſs expoſed to ſome of the peculiar dangers of popular, and leſs requiring the peculiar advantages of monarchical government) unable to ſtand, for any length of time, either againſt proſperity or adverſity: ſometimes betrayed; ſometimes unexpectedly overrun and demoliſhed; and ſometimes falling, by their very greatneſs, which the weak and rotten foundation on which they were built, was utterly unable to maintain.

It would be offenſive, perhaps, to detail juſtly, and as the ſubject deſerves, all the reaſons which induce us not to throw aſide the concluſions of our reaſon, ſupported by the event and experience of all the ancient republics, in compliance to thoſe which have been eſtabliſhed in modern times, or even to that which is only now eſtabliſhing; and which promiſes ſo much (inaſmuch, at leaſt, as the maintaining order, liberty, ſecurity, or property, is any object of government) more than hitherto it has performed. It is ſufficient to ſay, that no one of theſe republics has, for any length of time, yet equalled us

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in thoſe ſolid attainments which we contend to be the fruits of our conſtitution, and the great end of all government; civil liberty, and political power; ſecurity of our perſons and our property at home; and independent political greatneſs to protect them abroad.

In no country is human nature more improved, or its condition, in ſocial life, more benefited, than under our government; in none are all the means of acquiring, whatever induſtry or enterpriſe can give, more aſſiſted by the conſtitution; in none are better principles of reaſon or religion taught; nor a better national character formed to direct us in the uſe of all the affluence and happineſs we enjoy. Theſe are ſolid reaſons why we ſhould adhere to the wiſdom of our anceſtors, and accept the benefits we derive from it, with reſpect towards them, and with gratitude to the great Author of the univerſe. Neceſſity, and the nature of things, firſt drew men to eſtabliſh monarchy; reaſon, and the civilization of mankind, induced them afterwards to introduce regulations; in one inſtance, for public convenience going beyond the firſt idea of monarchy, by making it hereditary; and in others without number,

providing variety of checks to prevent the neceſſary powers of government from being abuſed.

It has hitherto been the boaſt of Engliſhmen, that they have gone farther than every other nation of ancient or modern times, to reſtrain the abuſe without impairing the energy of government; to connect the power of the ſovereign with the freedom of the ſubject; to fix the throne in the hearts of his people; to make the king great by the liberty of his ſubjects, and theſe ſecure by the very greatneſs which that liberty had eſtabliſhed. Theſe, and theſe principles only, have guided our anceſtors in forming a conſtitution, which, I truſt, they have alſo left us virtue enough to deſerve for ourſelves, and ſpirit enough to tranſmit, unaltered, to our poſterity. This is not the language of declamation, but the actual theory of the Britiſh conſtitution, adopted by our nation, in preference to every other ſyſtem of government, and practically producing the benefits intended by it. But let no man run away with the idea either that we have not, at various times, had the ſuggeſtion of all theſe new doctrines made to us, or eaſy opportuni-

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ties of adopting and eſtabliſhing them, if they had not been repugnant to the general ſenſe of the nation. How many proſelytes, and of what ſort, did Jack Cade get, in the reign of Henry VI. to the firſt edition which *he* publiſhed, of the very doctrines now ſo induſtriouſly circulated? I ſay, which *he* publiſhed; for, ridiculous as it might ſeem, (if any thing be ridiculous which was pregnant with ſo much miſery and miſchief) the whole code now adopted by the French, and recommended, by the decree of confraternity, to every other nation, was promulged, and the traitors who promulged it knocked down, or hung, ſome centuries before the birth of any one of the preſent *inſpired* reformers. What preſident of a convention in France, England, Ireland, or Scotland, has been able to improve, or to add one tittle of recommendation to the perſuaſive eloquence of Jack Cade, who, by the bye, it is worth obſerving, uſes not only the ſame ideas, but almoſt the literal language now uſed in the decrees and reſolutions of modern reformers.

Cade.—" Our enemies ſhall fall before us, *inſpired*
" with the ſpirit of putting down kings and princes
" —Be brave then, for your captain is brave, and

" vows reformation. There ſhall be, in England,
" ſeven halfpenny loaves ſold for a penny, the
" three-hooped pot ſhall have ten hoops, and I will
" make it felony to drink ſmall beer: *all the realm*
" *ſhall be in common*; and in Cheapſide ſhall my
" palfry go to graſs: and when I am king, as king
" I will be, *there ſhall be no money*; all ſhall eat and
" drink upon my ſcore; and I will apparel them all
" in one livery, that *they may agree like brothers, and*
" *worſhip me their lord.*" Henry VI. Part II.

But to quit the arguments of robbers, addreſſed to traitors, to paſs over the arguments uſed by deſperate and deſigning perſons, with the ſole view of inſtigating the loweſt rabble to the deſtruction of every thing great or good, or reſpectable, and to come to graver ideas of liberty and government; why was magna charta tendered to king John, expreſſing the rights of ſubjects, and not the new-fangled Rights of Man? Was it becauſe king John had more power to reſiſt it than the preſent unhappy king of France? No, it was becauſe our anceſtors wanted *to be governed*, though they wiſhed to be governed by law, and becauſe they thought their welfare concerned in the dignity of the crown, and their honour intereſted in the very ſubmiſſion

miſſion of their oppreſſor. Why was Harrington's * book thought chimerical by all

* Even Harrington never preached the prepoſterous doctrines now propagated; and, indeed, had he lived in France in the preſent times, would certainly have been maſſacred as an ariſtocrat, for the following paſſage, which, both for its good ſenſe and *its authority*, I cannot help recommending to my readers. "A nobility, or "gentry, (*ſays he*) in a popular government, not over-"balancing it, is the very life and ſoul of it." *And again, in another place*, "It will be convenient, in this place, "to ſpeak a word to ſuch as go about to inſinuate to the "nobility and gentry a fear of the people, or to the "people a fear of the nobility and gentry, as if their "intereſts were deſtructive to each other, when, in-"deed, an army may as well conſiſt of ſoldiers without "officers, or of officers without ſoldiers, as a common-"wealth, (eſpecially ſuch a one as is capable of great-"neſs) of a people without a gentry, or of a gentry "without a people. Wherefore this, (though not al-"ways ſo intended, as may appear by Machiavel, who "elſe would be guilty) is a *pernicious error*. There is "ſomething firſt in making of a commonwealth, then "in the governing of it, and, laſt of all, in leading of "its armies; which (though there be great divines, "great lawyers, great men in all profeſſions, *for not "even one of whom, by the bye, the new ſyſtem makes any "proviſion*) ſeems to be peculiar only to the genius of a "gentleman. For ſo it is, in the univerſal ſeries of "ſtory, that if any man has founded a commonwealth, "*he was firſt a gentleman*." OCEANA, fol. edit. p. 56.

mankind

mankind in the laſt century, when the king had been murdered, the nobility diſgraced and rooted out, and every thing low, lawleſs, and licentious, by turns triumphant.

Why did the people acquieſce in the monarchy of Oliver Cromwell? Was it a bigoted reſpect to a long line of royal anceſtors which placed or kept that uſurper on the throne? Was it a loyal attachment, or ſuperſtitious veneration for his ſacred and anointed perſon? No—neither ſanctity nor conſecration, neither right nor title, had been able to protect the head of his predeceſſor, whoſe utmoſt ſtretch of *his* lawful prerogative never equalled this man's daily tyrannies and uſurpations. It was, that the people felt the advantages of a monarchy even in the hands of an uſurper; they felt the ſecurity at home, and credit abroad, which they enjoyed in perfection, even under that monarchy: for theſe reaſons they preferred the tyranny of an uſurper to the tyranny of a mob; and when the opportunity offered, they pruned the branches, but did not injure the ſtock on which monarchical government has ever flouriſhed in theſe iſlands. Far, indeed, from injuring the ſtock, the broken, or luxuriant

branches

branches being pruned, the roots have ſtruck into better ſoil, and the tree has ever ſince been an object, not of ſuperſtitious adoration, but of rational devotion from the ſhelter which its ſpreading branches afford the nation. Why, again, on the abdication of James the Second, did we omit to eſtabliſh theſe theories? Was it either becauſe we wanted power, or becauſe they were, at that time, lights unknown to us, which no Herſchel's teleſcope had then been invented to diſcover? The throne was *abandoned*; the people were exaſperated, almoſt to madneſs, by the perſonal conduct of the late ſovereign. The garret of every theoriſt, and the brain of every enthuſiaſt, for years, had been teeming with ſchemes for utopian liberty and arcadian paradiſes; for organiſing all the various and licentious uſurpation of power which imagination could deviſe, or to which the diſtraction of former reigns had, by turns, given birth. This country choſe no ſuch form of government; no ſuch baſis on which to reſt either the power of the ſtate, or the obedience of the people:—and ſhall we for a moment, raiſed as we have been by the wiſdom and the ſpirit of our anceſtors in forming our preſent conſtitution, to a pitch

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of political greatneſs and domeſtic happineſs, unrivalled in the hiſtory of the world, ſhall we for a moment entertain thoſe exploded theories now thus inſultingly offered us? and offered us by whom? By public incendiaries, by fugitives, from the juſtice of that very government which they try to ſubvert, or by the hired emiſſaries of a foreign enemy. The very ſuſpicion is a reproach to Engliſhmen, which nothing ſhort of overt acts ſhall lead me to entertain, notwithſtanding the vaunted celebrity of ſome of theſe theories, and the artificial avidity with which they are conſumed by the common people;—and here let me put the honeſt and well-intentioned part of my countrymen upon their guard, that they may not be miſled by fancying that the publicity of ſome of theſe books is any criterion either of their merit or of their repute.

An author, if he writes libels or treaſon, may eaſily gain circulation for his works; and, with ſtill greater eaſe, a very public notice and ſtation for himſelf: but the brand of infamy is as *public* as the ſtamp of honour; and the whole diſtinction lies between public deteſtation and public gratitude and reſpect. That among the various vices of human nature,

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and among ſuch of them as call moſt particularly for the ſtrong reſtraint of civil government, there is to be found that groveling and malignant ſpirit which, without powers to ſerve mankind, has powers to diſturb the portion of happineſs at preſent enjoyed; which exults like a madman in miſchief, and is inſenſible to every conſideration of good or evil, of miſery or happineſs, which excite the feelings of a man who has either genius or virtue; is a truth, which we now read in the anxiety of every good citizen, for the welfare of his country, in the danger to which the happieſt and moſt thriving people of the globe are now expoſed, and in the ſecret exultation of every bad ſubject who loves the guilt, without venturing to riſque the puniſhment of treaſon. But I truſt that the laws are ſufficiently ſtrong, and the government of this country effectual, ſtill to protect us in the bleſſings we enjoy under a conſtitution which we venerate. Let us only not conſpire ourſelves with thoſe who are conſpiring againſt us. Let us watch, with unwearied vigilance, the conduct both of foreign and domeſtic enemies; and equally defend ourſelves againſt thoſe enemies who attack us from without,

and thoſe traitors who co-operate with them to betray us from within. We enjoy ſecurity and plenty, perhaps in the utmoſt poſſible degree; the one univerſal to every ſubject, the other more general here than in any other age or country. We have a king, beloved and reſpected by his ſubjects, who returns the loyalty of his people with parental fondneſs for the happy realms he governs. He has a miniſter equally admired for the wonderful eminence of his abilities, and the integrity unqueſtionable, even in this age of queſtioning every thing, both of his private and public life. The country is happy and thriving in a degree unknown in its own annals, or thoſe of other nations. Even thoſe whom difference of political ſentiments, or the hoſtile contention of parties ſeparates upon other points, agree in dutiful allegiance to the king, and unalterable attachment to the conſtitution. Should they continue to watch, with caution, perhaps with jealouſy, the conduct of thoſe miniſters, to whom, at leaſt, they have no partiality, the people at large may profit by their independance, their vigilance, and perhaps occaſionally by their diſtruſt; but every day proves, and I truſt will more and more prove,

(at leaſt of the moſt reſpectable perſons of that body to which I allude) that whether the advantages of faction and treaſon are moſt impudently recommended by the hired incendiaries of any other country, or ſpeciouſly introduced with the hope of diſtreſſing government, and the proſpect of their gaining greater political power in the convulſions of public confuſion, whether miſchievous meaſures are recommended by miſtaken friends, or pretended philoſophers; by open enemies of the country, or deſigning partiſans of their own, they will equally reply to all, and by their conduct maintain that reply, with the patriotiſm and firmneſs of their anceſtors—*Nolumus leges Angliæ mutare.*

THE END.